

**ACHPR IMPLEMENTATION REPORTING TEMPLATE UNDER THE  
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE (COMPLAINANT, CSO & NHRI)**  
*(Adopted pursuant to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Rules of Procedure of the  
African Commission, 2020)*

**SECTION I: DECISION / RECOMMENDATION**

Communication Number:	Communication 402/11 and 420/12
Name of the Complainant(s)	Sudanese Civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (represented by the REDRESS Trust, Sudan Democracy First Group, Human Rights Watch, INTERIGHTS, and Enough Project).
Respondent State	The Republic of Sudan
Date of Decision (Year)	2023
Reporting Period	<b>From:</b> 28 July 2025 <b>To:</b> 23 June 2026

**SECTION II: REPORTING ENTITY**

Name of CSO / NHRI	The Redress Trust
Observer/ Affiliate Status Number	
Contact Details	Alejandra Vicente ( <a href="mailto:alejandra@redress.org">alejandra@redress.org</a> ) Julie Bardèche ( <a href="mailto:julie@redress.org">julie@redress.org</a> ) Caitlan Lloyd ( <a href="mailto:caitlan@redress.org">caitlan@redress.org</a> ) Copying: <a href="mailto:cases@redress.org">cases@redress.org</a>

**SECTION III: DETAILS OF THE DECISION**

*Information provided in this section should be drawn from the official text of the Commission's decision*

Brief Facts of the Communication	<p>Starting on 5 June 2011 the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and militia groups, under the control of the Respondent State's Government, launched a series of assaults against civilians in South Kordofan. On 1 September 2011, a similar pattern of attacks began against civilians in Blue Nile State.</p> <p>More than 31 attacks were documented after assaults began, including the bombing of the market in Kurchi, South Kordofan, which killed 13 civilians and injured more than 20 others, most of whom were women and children. Eyewitnesses in Tilo, South Kordofan, reported that the SAF sealed the doors of civilian homes and then set fire to the buildings, burning alive the civilians who were trapped inside. Further reports showed that the SAF removed the bodies of slain Sudanese Civilians</p>
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	<p>from the Tilo and El Gardud villages in South Kordofan and placed them in mass graves that had been freshly dug for that purpose. The pattern was the same in Blue Nile State. SAF forces attacked Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile. Government war planes targeted civilian areas and armed soldiers chased, captured, and killed civilians fleeing from the attacks.</p> <p>As of January 2012, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that approximately 366,000 individuals had been internally displaced or severely affected by the violence in the two States. Since June 2011, more than 140,000 refugees fled South Kordofan or Blue Nile to either Ethiopia or South Sudan. The Victims did not necessarily find safety in refugee camps, because the SAF bombed the Yida refugee camp in South Sudan which is home to many of those displaced from South Kordofan.</p> <p>In addition to civilian dwellings, schools, and hospitals, the SAF also targeted fields used for civilian food cultivation. Since these assaults took place during the planting season, the Victims were left without a harvest, creating grave food insecurity. The Respondent State also refused to allow international organisations to deliver humanitarian aid, including food and medical supplies, into the affected areas.</p> <p>The Respondent State made clear its intention to cleanse South Kordofan and Blue Nile States of the ethnic and racial groups who live there. For instance, a video published by Al Jazeera showed the governor of South Kordofan, Ahmad Haroun, telling SAF soldiers deployed to the Nuba Mountains, in South Kordofan, to “take no prisoners... hand over the place swept, rubbed, crushed.” On 27 April 2007, the International Criminal Court issued a <a href="#">warrant</a> for Haroun’s arrest.</p>
Summarise the Commission’s principal findings	<p>The Commission found that the Respondent State had violated Articles 1, 2 (Right to non-discrimination), 3(2) (Right to equality), 4 (Right to life), 5 (Right to respect of dignity and prohibition of torture and ill-treatment), 7(1)(a) (Right to a fair trial), 12(1) (Right to free movement), 14 (Right to property), 16 (Right to health), 18 (Right to family life), 19 (Right to equality), 20 (Right to existence and self-determination), 21 (Right to freely dispose wealth and natural resources), and 23 (Right to peace) of the African Charter.</p>
Key Recommendations / Remedies	<p>The Respondent State should: (1) guarantee the rights found to have been violated; (2) promptly investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible; (3) ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003; (4) ratify the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 2009; (5) adopt legislative, administrative, judicial and all other necessary measures to implement the Niamey Guidelines; (6) immediately release all arbitrarily detained civilians and ensure that those detained on a lawful basis enjoy full due process rights; (7) urgently facilitate unimpeded access by humanitarian aid groups to deliver assistance; (8) allow full and effective access for international monitors; (9) provide appropriate housing and basic needs to displaced persons; (10) ensure the safe return of the displaced persons</p>

	to their communities after the unrest has ceased; and (11) reform its national legislation.
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## SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

<p><b>RECOMMENDATION 1</b> <i>Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):</i></p>	<p><b>The Commission urges the Respondent State to guarantee all the rights found to have been violated</b> in this communication in accordance with its obligation under Article 1 of the African Charter.</p>
<p>Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i></p>	<p>We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to guarantee any of the rights found to have been violated.</p> <p>On 24 October 2025, the Redress Trust transmitted our “Submission on Remedies and Reparation” to the Commission (Reparation Submission), which is appended. The Reparation Submission provides detailed analysis on the extent to which the Respondent State has implemented the Commission’s recommendations (including Recommendation 1), as well as the additional measures necessary to ensure the Victims’ right to remedies and reparation. As detailed in the Reparation Submission, the Respondent State passed several legal reforms related to the Commission’s recommendation during the tenure of the ill-fated transitional government, prior to the Reporting Period. In July 2020, the Respondent State enacted the <a href="#">Miscellaneous Amendments Law of 2020 (Repeal or Amend the Provisions Restricting Freedoms) Law No. 12 of 2020</a>. The law made various changes to the law, including, in addition to those changes identified in the Reparation Submission:</p> <p>(i) Article 115(2) of the <a href="#">Criminal Law Act 1991</a>, recognising that torture can be inflicted both physically and psychologically, and increasing the penalty from three months to three years;</p> <p>(ii) Article 4(d) of the <a href="#">Criminal Procedure Act 1991</a>, explicitly prohibiting torture of an accused person (albeit as a “principle to be regarded” rather than a substantive provision of criminal law); and</p> <p>(iii) Articles 50 to 53 of the <a href="#">National Security Act 2010</a>, removing immunities that members of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) previously enjoyed, and removing NISS’ broad powers of arrest and detention (though these have since been reinstated, see <a href="#">below</a>).</p> <p>In December 2020, a group of civil society organisations, led by Project Expedite Justice, reached an <a href="#">amicable settlement</a> with the Respondent State (during the tenure of the transitional government) in the matter of Communication No. 0011/Com/001/2018, which was before the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC Settlement). The ACERWC Settlement concerned the Respondent State’s actions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile from June and September 2011, covering materially the same facts as the present Communication but instead alleging violations by the Respondent</p>

	<p>State of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Child Rights Charter).</p> <p>The ACERWC Settlement is appended and includes various commitments made by the Respondent State that are relevant to the Commission’s recommendations in this Communication, and that are referenced throughout this form. Regarding Recommendation 1, the Respondent State:</p> <p>(i) acknowledged its responsibility for the violation of its Child Rights Charter Obligations and committed to three public ceremonies to reiterate this responsibility.<sup>1</sup> It is unclear if these ceremonies took place;</p> <p>(ii) recognised the commission of human rights violations, including atrocity and sexual/gender-based violent crimes, by Respondent State forces, and aligned militia against children in South Kordofan and Blue Nile since 2011, and committed to undertaking legislative, administrative, educational, and other measures to promote the investigation of such violations and to prevent their repetition;<sup>2</sup> and</p> <p>(iii) agreed to publicise the ACERWC Settlement,<sup>3</sup> install a memorial structure and consider other memorialisation measures in memory of victims in each of South Kordofan and Blue Nile,<sup>4</sup> restore educational infrastructure and provision,<sup>5</sup> and restore health and water infrastructure and services.<sup>6</sup></p> <p>On 23-31 May 2021, the ACERWC conducted an investigative mission to the Respondent State to monitor implementation of the ACERWC Settlement, the report of which is appended. The report describes some encouraging, albeit modest, initial progress. However, we understand that while various action plans were developed for the further implementation of the ACERWC Settlement, this process was effectively aborted months later in October 2021 due to the military coup d’état.</p>
<p>Outstanding Gaps/Concerns</p>	<p>To our best knowledge, the Commission’s recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.</p>
<p>Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.</p>	<p>At the time of writing the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N al-Hilu) collectively control significant parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Respondent State’s lack of control in these areas will impact its ability to implement some of</p>

<sup>1</sup> ACERWC Settlement, B.1.

<sup>2</sup> ACERWC Settlement, H.1.

<sup>3</sup> ACERWC Settlement, B.2.

<sup>4</sup> ACERWC Settlement, B.3.

<sup>5</sup> ACERWC Settlement, E.1-3.

<sup>6</sup> ACERWC Settlement, F.1-2.

	the Commission’s orders, as detailed further in the Reparation Submission. See also Recommendation 2 below.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 2</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission urges the Respondent State to set up an independent inquiry to carry out prompt, effective and impartial investigations</b> into the circumstances of the abovementioned violations, and ensure that where sufficient evidence exists, the perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable for any violations.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	<p>We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible.</p> <p>In the ACERWC Settlement, the Respondent State made certain acknowledgements of responsibility in relation to violations of the Child Rights Charter (see Recommendation 1 above). It also committed to designating a third party to conduct an independent and impartial assessment in the Blue Nile areas then held by the SPLM-N of the damage done to educational and health services and infrastructure during the conflict.<sup>7</sup> However, this was to inform the restoration of educational and health infrastructure, rather than for accountability purposes.</p>
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission’s recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	<p>Despite being regularly implicated in core international crimes, the Respondent State has declined to investigate, prosecute, and punish SAF officers, except in exceptionally rare cases. This trend has been consistent through the Presidency of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019), the transitional government (2019-2021), the de facto authorities installed following the October 2021 military coup d’état (2021-2023), and the reconfigured coup authorities during the ongoing armed conflict (2023-present).</p> <p>The <a href="#">key factors</a> driving this are: (i) the Respondent State’s reliance on its torture apparatus to gain and preserve political power and wealth; (ii) resulting lack of political will to prosecute State military, intelligence, and security actors; (iii) the extreme power, reach, and legal discretion of the SAF and other military, intelligence, and security services, coupled with lack of oversight; (iv) lack of independence and oversight of the police, public prosecution, and judiciary; (v) lack of victim/witness protections; (vi) deliberate steps taken by the Respondent State to destroy or restrict access to evidence; and (vii) broad immunities from prosecution enjoyed by the SAF and other military, intelligence, and security services.</p> <p>The few prosecutions that have taken place have been in response to isolated, often large-scale crimes, where there is significant,</p>

<sup>7</sup> ACERWC Settlement, D.1.

	sustained public pressure to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible. See also Recommendation 1 above.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 3</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission recommends to the Respondent State to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003</b> , in order to safeguard and ensure the protection of women from gender-based discrimination, violence against women and sexual violence in times of war and armed conflict, in line with its existing obligations under Articles 2 and 18(3) of the African Charter.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003.  In the ACERWC Settlement, the Respondent State made various commitments to sign or ratify human rights instruments, and withdraw certain treaty reservations, understandings, and declarations. <sup>8</sup> To the best of our knowledge, the only commitments that the Respondent State has satisfied to date is <a href="#">ratifying</a> the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or punishment in August 2021.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to ratify the above Protocol. See Recommendations 1 and 2 above for additional detail on the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will, respectively.
Additional Comments (if any)	The Respondent State's authorities lack the legal and constitutional legitimacy to ratify regional or international instruments. For this reason, recommendations for ratification should be directed to a future legitimate and democratically elected Sudanese government.  The ACERWC Settlement investigative mission report erroneously claims that the Respondent State had ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
<b>RECOMMENDATION 4</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission recommends to the Respondent State to ratify the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 2009 (Kampala Convention)</b> , in order to prevent internal displacement and protect as well as assist internally displaced persons in Sudan.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to ratify the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 2009.

<sup>8</sup> ACERWC Settlement, G.1-5.

<i>information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to ratify the above AU Convention. See Recommendations 1 and 2 above for additional detail on the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will, respectively.
Additional Comments (if any)	See Recommendation 3 above.
<b>RECOMMENDATION 5</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission recommends to the Respondent State to adopt legislative, administrative, judicial and all other necessary measures to implement the Niamey Guidelines</b> and to ensure that the rights and obligations therein are guaranteed in fact and in law, including during armed conflicts, crisis situations and states of emergency. This will include examining legislative and regulatory provisions and all other relevant provisions to ensure that they are compliant with the provisions of the Guidelines.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to adopt legislative, administrative, judicial and all other necessary measures to implement the Niamey Guidelines.  For completeness, in the ACERWC Settlement, the Respondent State made various commitments to enact legal reforms concerning atrocity crimes and sexual/gender-based violence. <sup>9</sup> To the best of our knowledge, none of these commitments have been satisfied to date by the Respondent State.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to undertake necessary legal, administrative, judicial, and other reforms. See Recommendations 1 and 2 above for additional detail on the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will, respectively.
Additional Comments (if any)	See Recommendation 3 above, which also extends to the Respondent State's authorities' lack of legitimacy to enact laws.
<b>RECOMMENDATION 6</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to immediately release all arbitrarily detained civilians and ensure that those detained on a lawful basis enjoy full due process rights.</b>
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to immediately release all arbitrarily detained civilians and ensure that those detained on a lawful basis enjoy full due process rights.

<sup>9</sup> ACERWC Settlement, H.1-3.

Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the start of the Reporting Period.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	See Recommendations 1 and 2 above.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 7</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to urgently facilitate unimpeded access by humanitarian aid groups to deliver assistance to civilians in all parts of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.</b>
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to urgently facilitate unimpeded access by humanitarian aid groups to deliver assistance to civilians in all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.  For completeness, in the ACERWC Settlement, the Respondent State made commitments to guarantee unfettered access by aid organisations, provide reasons for limiting or denying aid access, and not deny access if a civilian population is threatened with starvation. <sup>10</sup> To the best of our knowledge, none of these commitments have been satisfied to date by the Respondent State.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	The Respondent State continues to fail to facilitate unimpeded access by humanitarian aid groups to deliver assistance to civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) regulates the delivery of aid in SAF-controlled areas, <a href="#">posing significant operational and access challenges</a> . Actors involved with delivery of aid, especially volunteers with mutual aid groups, may face <a href="#">arbitrary arrest, detention, and abuse</a> by the Respondent State's authorities.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	See Recommendation 1 above. The Rapid Support Forces, which together with the SPLM-N al-Hilu, controls most of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, has established its own parallel body to the HAC - the <a href="#">Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations</a> . Heavy fighting also <a href="#">routinely blocks key humanitarian routes</a> .
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 8</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to allow full and effective access for international monitors, including human rights officers, to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.</b>
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to allow full and effective access for international monitors, including human rights officers, to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

<sup>10</sup> ACERWC Settlement, C.1-2.

<i>information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	See Recommendation 1 above.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 9</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to provide appropriate housing and basic needs to the displaced persons in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the AU Convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa.</b>
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to provide appropriate housing and basic needs to the displaced persons.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	See Recommendation 1 above.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
<b>RECOMMENDATION 10</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	<b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to ensure the safe return of the displaced persons to their communities after the unrest has ceased.</b>
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to ensure the safe return of the displaced persons to their communities after the unrest has ceased.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented since the Reporting Period began.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The Respondent State is experiencing on ongoing armed conflict, which began on 15 April 2023 and has heavily affected South Kordofan and Blue Nile. See Recommendation 1 above.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A

<p><b>RECOMMENDATION 11</b> Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):</p>	<p><b>The Commission calls on the Respondent State to reform its national legislation</b> so that:</p> <p>(i) the Respondent State provides for adequate and effective safeguards against abusive use of force as well as abuse of powers in the course of arrest and detention by government forces, law enforcement and security officials;</p> <p>(ii) Recognise the right of the Nuba people to equality and non-discrimination pursuant to Article 19 of the African Charter and their right to existence as distinct category of minority people by virtue of Article 20 of the Charter, with full rights on their land and the use of the resources on their land in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter;</p> <p>(iii) arbitrary or abusive use of force as well as violations committed in the course of arrest and detention procedures by government forces and law enforcement officials, including torture and ill-treatment, enforced disappearances and rape, are effectively recognised as a criminal offence under the penal codes in Sudan;</p> <p>(iv) the Respondent State provides for the criminal accountability of officials responsible for violations, including by removing the immunity that officials enjoy for such crimes under Sudanese legislation; and</p> <p>(v) the Respondent State ensures training in international human rights and international humanitarian law to law enforcement and military personnel and NISS agents.</p>
<p>Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i></p>	<p>We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to reform its national legislation as recommended by the Commission.</p> <p>See Recommendations 1 and 5 above on reforms prior to the Reporting Period and the status of commitments made by the Respondent State in the ACERWC Settlement.</p>
<p>Outstanding Gaps or Concerns</p>	<p>To our best knowledge, the Commission’s recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.</p>
<p>Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.</p>	<p>The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to undertake necessary legal reforms. See Recommendations 1 and 2 above for additional detail on the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will, respectively.</p>
<p>Additional Comments (if any)</p>	<p>See Recommendations 3 and 5 above.</p>

## SECTION V: CSO / NHRI FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION

*This section captures concrete follow-up actions undertaken by the reporting CSO/NHRI to promote or monitor the implementation of the Commission's recommendations, including stakeholders' engagement and outcomes achieved. Leave this section blank if no follow-up actions have been undertaken.*

<i>Decision / Recommendation Followed Up</i>	<i>Follow-up Action(s) Taken (e.g. letter, meeting, litigation, advocacy)</i>	<i>Key Stakeholders Engaged</i>	<i>Timeline / Dates</i>	<i>Outcomes of Engagement</i>	<i>Impact / Next Steps</i>
Communication 402/11 and 420/12	We continue to monitor the legal and factual situation in the Respondent State, including engaging with Sudanese CSOs working on torture and other human rights issues.	Sudanese CSOs	Ongoing	Monitoring, the findings of which are set out above.	
	Survivor consultation	Victims	Ongoing	This activity has been delayed due to the security situation in areas where Victims are located.	

## SECTION VI: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

*Indicate suggested follow-up actions (e.g. to send reminders, organize working meetings with parties, conduct hearings, undertake promotional or protective missions, referrals, etc.):*

- (i) The Commission has recently decided numerous other cases finding the Respondent State responsible for violations of the African Charter, including Communications 443/13 (Safia Ishaq Mohammed Issa), 471/14 (Meriam Yahia Ibrahim and three others), 476/14 (Magdy Moustafa El-Baghdady), and 511/15 (Dr. Amin Mekki Medani and Mr. Farouq Abu Eissa). Given the common root causes of the underlying violations and the complementarity between the Commission's recommendations in these cases, the Commission should consider following up on the implementation of these cases jointly.
- (ii) The Commission should engage closely with the African Union Fact-Finding Mission on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (AU FFM) to ensure that its implementation process is coordinated with and informed by the work of the AU FFM, and so that the AU FFM can reflect and elaborate on the Commission's recommendations in its reports. This should also include close cooperation with the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, building on the [joint statement](#) issued by these bodies on 13 April 2026.
- (iii) The Commission should coordinate with the ACERWC to identify synergies and minimise duplication during the implementation of Communication 402/11 and 420/12, led by the Commission, and Communication No. 0011/Com/001/2018, led by the ACERWC.

- (iv) The Commission should instruct the country rapporteur for the Respondent State to follow-up with the Respondent State authorities on implementation, including reminding the Respondent State to report on implementation.
- (v) The Commission should instruct its Secretariat to publish and maintain a comprehensive register of all cases involving the Respondent State, recording the recommendations made and status of implementation.
- (vi) The Commission should ensure that the full list of recommendations it has addressed to the Respondent State in its Sudan decisions to date is considered for any country visits, as well as the State reporting procedure/review process.
- (vii) The Commission should convene implementation working meetings and hearings with State representatives during its sessions and allow victims' representatives to participate in a section of the meeting, to promote implementation and dialogue (as is done in other regional human rights systems).


#### **SECTION VII: DECLARATION**

*Kindly complete this section by either signing in ink (pen signature) and scanning the signed document, or by affixing a valid electronic signature.*

I/We certify that the information provided in this form is accurate and submitted in good faith.

Name: Alejandra Vicente

Organisation: REDRESS



Signature:

Date: 23 June 2026