

ACHPR IMPLEMENTATION REPORTING TEMPLATE UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE (COMPLAINANT, CSO & NHRI)

(Adopted pursuant to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, 2020)

SECTION I: DECISION / RECOMMENDATION

Communication Number:	Communication 511/15
Name of the Complainant(s)	(1) Dr. Amin Mekki Medani (2) Mr. Farouq Abu Eissa, represented by the Redress Trust, the African Centre for Justice Peace Studies, the International Federation for Human Rights, and the World Organisation against Torture.
Respondent State	The Republic of Sudan
Date of Decision (Year)	2022
Reporting Period	From: 02 August 2023 To: 23 June 2026

SECTION II: REPORTING ENTITY

Name of CSO / NHRI	The Redress Trust
Observer / Affiliate Status Number	
Contact Details	Alejandra Vicente (alejandra@redress.org) Julie Bardèche (julie@redress.org) Caitlan Lloyd (caitlan@redress.org) Copying: cases@redress.org

SECTION III: DETAILS OF THE DECISION

Information provided in this section should be drawn from the official text of the Commission's decision

Brief Facts of the Communication	The First Victim was 75 years of age and suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure. He was a prominent Sudanese human rights defender and lawyer, who died on 31 August 2018. The Second Victim was 81 years of age, diabetic, and suffering from a heart condition and cyanosis. He was a well-known political activist, who died on 12 April 2020. Days before their arrest, both Victims participated in political negotiations that led to the adoption of the Sudan Call, an agreement between political opposition parties,
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	rebel movements, and civil society pledging work towards the cessation of conflicts and legal, institutional, and economic reforms in the Respondent State. Following their return from negotiations, personnel from the Respondent State's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) arrested the Victims. The NISS took the Victims to NISS offices in Bahri, Khartoum, without providing any reasons for their arrest. NISS refused requests by the First Victim to take medicine required to treat his diabetes. The NISS did not charge the Victims upon arrest and held them for 16 days, when they were transferred from NISS custody to Kober Prison in Khartoum. Whilst the Victims were detained, the NISS raided the offices of the Sudanese Human Rights Monitor (of which the First Victim was chair), ordering participants to leave a workshop, temporarily detaining one of the participants, and confiscating a number of laptops and documents. Both Victims were detained at Kober Prison and at high risk of irreparable harm as a result of further detention, with an adverse impact on their health. This concern was aggravated by the prospects of an unfair trial for offences that carried the death penalty. The First Victim was not allowed to meet his lawyers for fifteen days and was only granted his first family visit a day later. His family was then permitted for the first time to bring food that was compatible with his health needs as a diabetic. Fourteen days after his initial arrest, the Second Victim met with his lawyers for the first time since his arrest. On the same day, he was briefly taken to Alamal Hospital, a hospital owned by the NISS, due to high blood pressure. His family was able to visit him while he was in the hospital. The Complainants filed numerous legal challenges in the Respondent State. The Victims were later charged with offences concerning incitement to terrorism, which are punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty. They were tried before a Special Court. Several months later, the Respondent State's Minister of Justice announced the decision to stay the criminal proceedings against the Victims. On the same day, the Victims were released from Kober Prison.
Summarise the Commission's principal findings	The Commission found that the Respondent State had violated Articles 1, 5 (finding torture and inhuman treatment), 6 (Right to liberty and security), 7(1)(c) and (d) (Right to a fair trial), 9(2) (Right to free expression), and 10 (Right to free association) of the African Charter.
Key Recommendations / Remedies	The Respondent State should: (1) pay adequate compensation to the First Victim; (2) pay adequate

	compensation to the family of the deceased Second Victim; (3) promptly investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible; (4) continue to reform laws, policies and practices incompatible with the African Charter and international law; (5) adopt and implement procedural safeguards for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment; (6) implement principles and guidelines to safeguard the right to fair trial; (7) train security officers on relevant standards concerning adherence to custodial safeguards and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment; (8) improve conditions of detention; and (9) ensure that prisons are reformed in accordance with international standards.
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SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

RECOMMENDATION 1 <i>Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):</i>	Pay adequate compensation to the First Victim , in accordance with the domestic law of The Sudan for loss of earnings, medical expenses, physical and emotional suffering, and damages suffered in relation to the violations found.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to pay adequate compensation to the First Victim, or, after his death, to his family.
Outstanding Gaps/Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	Due to the ongoing internal armed conflict in the Respondent State first implementing (and the challenges noted in Recommendation 3 below), the institutions which may be in charge of implementing this measure are not reliable.
Additional Comments (if any)	The First Victim died on 31 August 2018. The Respondent State should therefore pay adequate compensation to his family. The likelihood of and obstacles to implementation in the Respondent State are likely to change over time. There may be new opportunities for implementation as part of a future peace, democratic transition, transitional justice, or reparation process. Meanwhile, given the Respondent State's history of serious violations of international law, any future implementation process will need to respond to an exceptionally large level of victimisation, stretching across multiple decades and different authorities. When hearing cases in which it finds that the Respondent State has violated provisions of the African Charter, the Commission should: (i) encourage the Complainant(s) to submit documentation substantiating the loss suffered;

	and (ii) endeavour to assess the minimum financial sum required for the Respondent State to make appropriate compensation. A specific financial sum as a reference point may increase the likelihood of implementation in the above circumstances.
RECOMMENDATION 2 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Pay adequate compensation to the family of the deceased Second Victim , in accordance with the domestic law of The Sudan, as well as existing human rights precedents and standards, for loss of earnings, medical expenses, emotional suffering and damages suffered in relation to the violations found.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to pay adequate compensation to the Second Victim's family.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	Due to the ongoing internal armed conflict in the Respondent State first implementing (and the challenges noted in Recommendation 3 below), the institutions which may be in charge of implementing this measure are not reliable.
Additional Comments (if any)	See Recommendation 1 above.
RECOMMENDATION 3 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Promptly and independently investigate, prosecute, and punish all State actors responsible for the unlawful detention, torture and inhuman treatment of the Victims.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	Despite being regularly implicated in core international crimes, the Respondent State has declined to investigate, prosecute, and punish NISS officers, except in exceptionally rare cases. This trend has been consistent through the Presidency of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019), the transitional government (2019-2021), the de facto authorities installed following the October 2021 military coup d'état (2021-2023), and the reconfigured coup authorities during the ongoing armed conflict (2023-present). The key factors driving this are: (i) the Respondent State's reliance on its torture apparatus to gain and preserve political power and wealth; (ii) resulting lack of political will to prosecute State intelligence actors; (iii) the extreme power, reach, and legal discretion of the NISS and other intelligence services, coupled with lack of oversight; (iv)

	lack of independence and oversight of the police, public prosecution, and judiciary; (v) lack of victim/witness protections; (vi) deliberate steps taken by the Respondent State to destroy or restrict access to evidence; and (vii) broad immunities from prosecution enjoyed by the NISS and other intelligence services. The few prosecutions that have taken place have been in response to isolated, often large-scale crimes, where there is significant, sustained public pressure to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 4 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Continue to reform laws, policies and practices incompatible with the African Charter and international law, in particular: (i) further amend the National Security Act 2010 (amended by law No. 12/2020), to ensure that it is in line with the African Charter, as well as other regional and international human rights instruments and standards; and (ii) further amend the Criminal Procedure Act 1991 (amended in 2020) to: prohibit the arrest of individuals without a warrant where the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed under international human rights treaties to which The Sudan is a party; ensure that any person arrested and detained on a criminal charge is brought before a judge within 48 hours, and is guaranteed the right of access to a lawyer from the beginning of criminal proceedings; and ensure that an arrested person's right to inform a third party or family member as soon as possible upon arrest is guaranteed and not subject to prosecutorial or judicial approval.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to further reform laws, policies and practices incompatible with the African Charter and international law. For completeness, the Respondent State passed several legal reforms related to the Commission's recommendation during the tenure of the ill-fated transitional government, before the Reporting Period began. In July 2020, the Respondent State enacted the Miscellaneous Amendments Law of 2020 (Repeal or Amend the Provisions Restricting Freedoms) Law No. 12 of 2020. The law made various changes to the law, including amending: (i) Article 115(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1991, recognising that torture can be inflicted both physically and psychologically, and increasing the penalty from three months to three years; (ii) Article 4(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1991, explicitly prohibiting torture of an accused person (albeit

	as a “principle to be regarded” rather than a substantive provision of criminal law); and (iii) Articles 50 to 53 of the National Security Act 2010, removing immunities that members of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) previously enjoyed, and removing NISS’ broad powers of arrest and detention (though these have since been reinstated, see below). The Respondent State’s actions during the ongoing armed conflict (which began on 15 April 2023) indicate that it has no intention to lift immunities shielding perpetrators of torture and associated violations. For instance: (i) on 8 February 2024, the de facto Sovereign Council of the Respondent State purportedly enacted the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, which re-introduces broad powers of arrest and detention, as well as sweeping immunities for NISS (which was rebranded the General Intelligence Service (GIS) in July 2019); and (ii) Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the de facto Head of State of the Respondent State, has reportedly granted a general amnesty to any combatant who defects from the Rapid Support Forces to the Respondent State-affiliated Sudanese Armed Forces.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	Numerous amendments remain necessary to align Sudanese law with the provisions of the African Charter and international law. A future legitimate and democratically elected Sudanese government should consider prioritising the following reforms, amongst others: (i) amending the Criminal Law Act 1991 and Criminal Procedure Act 1991 to make torture a distinct criminal offence, drafted not as a “principle to be regarded” but as a specific and separate crime; ensure that torture is prohibited under all circumstances, including during declared states of emergency and situations of armed conflict, and prevent the defence of “military or superior orders” as a justification for torture; (ii) amending the Criminal Procedure Act 1991 and any other related rules of procedure to ensure that there is a duty to investigate allegations of torture, and any prosecutorial decision to initiate an investigation is non-discretionary; any investigation regarding allegations of torture is carried out by a prosecutor or independent investigator other than the one in charge of the initial criminal investigation; arrested individuals promptly receive access to independent legal assistance at the interrogation stage; an arrested person’s right to inform a third party or family member as soon as possible upon

	arrest is guaranteed and not subject to prosecutorial or judicial approval; any person arrested and detained on a criminal charge is brought before a judge within 48 hours; and any person arrested and detained is guaranteed access to an independent medical examination; and (iii) amending the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, Armed Forces Act 2007, Police Forces Act 2008, and other relevant laws to abolish immunities for acts of torture and other acts conducted during official business.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to undertake necessary legal, policy, and practical reforms. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	The Respondent State's authorities lack the legal and constitutional legitimacy to enact laws after the October 2021 coup. For this reason, recommendations for legal reform should be directed to a future legitimate and democratically elected Sudanese government. In any event, the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, while not validly enacted as law, will be of considerable practical significance in the current circumstances by facilitating indefinite detentions and related torture and ill-treatment, as well as further shielding GIS members from future prosecutions.
RECOMMENDATION 5 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Adopt and implement procedural safeguards for the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment as required under the Robben Island Guidelines.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to adopt and implement procedural safeguards for the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to adopt and implement the necessary procedural safeguards. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 6 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Implement Principles and Guidelines to safeguard the right to fair trial as provided in the Commission's Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa Principles and Guidelines.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to

<i>sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	implement principles and guidelines to safeguard the right to fair trial.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented. See Recommendation 4 above.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to implement the necessary principles and guidelines. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 7 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Train Security Officers on relevant standards concerning adherence to custodial safeguards and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to train security officers on relevant standards concerning adherence to custodial safeguards and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to arrange the necessary training. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 8 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Improve conditions of detention in The Sudan.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to improve conditions of detention.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to improve detention conditions. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 9 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	Ensure that prisons are reformed in accordance with international standards.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to ensure that prisons are reformed in accordance with international standards.

Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to undertake necessary prison reforms. See Recommendation 3 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A

SECTION V: CSO / NHRI FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION

This section captures concrete follow-up actions undertaken by the reporting CSO/NHRI to promote or monitor the implementation of the Commission's recommendations, including stakeholders' engagement and outcomes achieved. Leave this section blank if no follow-up actions have been undertaken.

<i>Decision / Recommendation Followed Up</i>	<i>Follow-up Action(s) Taken (e.g. letter, meeting, litigation, advocacy)</i>	<i>Key Stakeholders Engaged</i>	<i>Timeline / Dates</i>	<i>Outcomes of Engagement</i>	<i>Impact / Next Steps</i>
Communication 511/15	We continue to monitor the legal and factual situation in the Respondent State, including engaging with Sudanese CSOs working on torture and other human rights issues.	Sudanese CSOs	Ongoing	Monitoring, the findings of which are set out above.	
	We are in contact with family members of the Victims to coordinate on implementation of the Commission's recommendations.	Family of Dr. Amin Mekki Medani and Mr. Farouq Abu Eissa (the Victims)	Ongoing	Coordination, the findings of which are set out above.	

SECTION VI: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Indicate suggested follow-up actions (e.g. to send reminders, organize working meetings with parties, conduct hearings, undertake promotional or protective missions, referrals, etc.):

- (i) The Commission has recently decided numerous other cases finding the Respondent State responsible for violations of the African Charter, including Communications 402/11 & 420/12 (Sudanese Civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile), 443/13 (Safia Ishaq Mohammed Issa), 471/14 (Meriam Yahia Ibrahim and three others), and 476/14 (Magdy Moustafa El-Baghdady). Given the common root causes of the underlying violations and the complementarity between the Commission's recommendations in these cases, the Commission should consider following up on the implementation of these cases jointly.
- (ii) The Commission should engage closely with the African Union Fact-Finding Mission on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (AU FFM) to ensure that its implementation process is coordinated with and informed by the work of the AU FFM, and so that the AU FFM can reflect and elaborate on the Commission's recommendations in its reports. This should also include close cooperation with the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, building on the [joint statement](#) issued by these bodies on 13 April 2026.
- (iii) The Commission should instruct the country rapporteur for the Respondent State to follow-up with the Respondent State authorities on implementation, including reminding the Respondent State to report on implementation.

- (iv) The Commission should instruct its Secretariat to publish and maintain a comprehensive register of all cases involving the Respondent State, recording the recommendations made and status of implementation.
- (v) The Commission should ensure that the full list of recommendations it has addressed to the Respondent State in its Sudan decisions to date is considered for any country visits, as well as the State reporting procedure/review process.
- (vi) The Commission should convene implementation working meetings and hearings with State representatives during its sessions and allow victims' representatives to participate in a section of the meeting, to promote implementation and dialogue (as is done in other regional human rights systems).


SECTION VII: DECLARATION

Kindly complete this section by either signing in ink (pen signature) and scanning the signed document, or by affixing a valid electronic signature.

I/We certify that the information provided in this form is accurate and submitted in good faith.

Name: Alejandra Vicente

Organisation: REDRESS

A handwritten signature in ink, appearing to read 'Alejandra Vicente', written over a horizontal line.

Signature:

Date: 23 June 2026