

**ACHPR IMPLEMENTATION REPORTING TEMPLATE UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE (COMPLAINANT, CSO & NHRI)**
*(Adopted pursuant to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Rules of Procedure of the
African Commission, 2020)*

SECTION I: DECISION / RECOMMENDATION

Communication Number:	Communication 471/14
Name of the Complainant(s)	(1) Meriam Yahia Ibrahim (2) Daniel Wani (3) Martin Wani (4) Maya Wani, represented by the Redress Trust, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the Sudanese Organisation for Development and Rehabilitation, the Sudanese Human Rights Initiative, and the Justice Centre for Advocacy and Legal Consultancy.
Respondent State	The Republic of Sudan
Date of Decision (Year)	2024
Reporting Period	From: 01 August 2025 To: 23 June 2026

SECTION II: REPORTING ENTITY

Name of CSO / NHRI	The Redress Trust
Observer/ Affiliate Status Number	
Contact Details	Alejandra Vicente (alejandra@redress.org) Julie Bardèche (julie@redress.org) Caitlan Lloyd (caitlan@redress.org) Copying: cases@redress.org

SECTION III: DETAILS OF THE DECISION

Information provided in this section should be drawn from the official text of the Commission's decision

Brief Facts of the Communication	The First Victim was arrested by the Respondent State's Public Order Police in Khartoum. She was charged with adultery and apostasy because of her marriage to a Christian, the Second Victim. She was considered a Muslim for criminal law purposes because her father was a Muslim, despite the First
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	Victim never being a Muslim and being raised as a Christian. She was arrested and detained with her son, the Third Victim, in Omdurman Women's Prison. During the criminal proceedings, the First Victim was subjected to medical examination against her will, because those who levied charges against her claimed that she was mentally ill. A medical report subsequently confirmed that she had no mental illness. The Court found the First Victim guilty of both offences and sentenced her to death by hanging for apostasy and 100 lashes for adultery. While detained in Omdurman Women's Prison, the First Victim gave birth to her daughter, the Fourth Victim. The First Victim was constantly kept in shackles in her cell since her sentence, and upon delivery, she was transferred to the prison clinic with her children, where the medical facilities were insufficient to provide adequate postnatal care. The Court of Appeal of Bahri and Sharq Al Nil subsequently revoked the convictions and the sentences imposed against the First Victim. Following this decision, the First, Third, and Fourth Victims were released from detention. As they were about to leave the Respondent State, the four Victims were all detained at a detention facility belonging to the Respondent State's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and denied access to their lawyers. They were held for two days, during which time the Respondent State accused the First Victim of forgery and providing false information. Shortly after the Victims were released (the First Victim, on bail), they left the Respondent State for Italy following negotiations between the Italian government and the Respondent State. They now reside in the United States.
Summarise the Commission's principal findings	The Commission found that the Respondent State had violated Articles 1, 2 (Right to non-discrimination), 3 (Right to equality), 4 (Right to life), 5 (Right to respect of dignity and prohibition of torture and ill-treatment), 6 (Right to liberty and security), 7 (Right to a fair trial), 8 (Freedom of religion), 16 (Right to health), and 18 (Right to family life) of the African Charter.
Key Recommendations / Remedies	The Commission: (1) urged the Respondent State to take all necessary measures to ensure that it provides effective remedies; (2) recommends restitution to the Complainants; (3) recommends that the Victims be compensated for material and non-material harm; (4)

	recommends a prompt and impartial investigation into the First Victim's arrest, indictment, detention, conviction, and sentencing; and (5) recommends a public acknowledgement of the facts and a public apology.
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SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

RECOMMENDATION 1 <i>Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):</i>	The Commission urges the Respondent State to take all necessary measures to ensure that it provides effective remedies , namely, restitution, compensation, policy, reforms, public apology, and legal reforms.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State during the Reporting Period to ensure that it provides effective remedies. For completeness, during the tenure of the ill-fated transitional government (prior to the Reporting Period), the Respondent State passed several legal reforms related to the Commission's recommendation. In November 2019, the Respondent State repealed the Public Order Laws that were implemented in each State and regulated the dress code for women in public, as well as relations between men and women. Subsequently, in July 2020, the Respondent State enacted the Miscellaneous Amendments Law of 2020 (Repeal or Amend the Provisions Restricting Freedoms) Law No. 12 of 2020. This made various changes to the law, including amending: (i) Article 115(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1991, recognising that torture can be inflicted both physically and psychologically, and increasing the penalty from three months to three years; (ii) Article 126 of the Criminal Law Act 1991, replacing the crime of apostasy with the crime of, functionally, blasphemy ("[a]nyone who publicly declares the apostasy of a person, sect or group of persons to express their religion or beliefs . . . shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or with a fine, or both."); (iii) Various articles of the Criminal Law Act 1991, removing flogging as a criminal sanction for a large number of criminal offences; (iv) Article 4(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1991, explicitly prohibiting torture of an accused person (albeit as a "principle to be regarded" rather than a substantive provision of criminal law); and

	(v) Articles 50 to 53 of the National Security Act 2010, removing immunities that members of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) previously enjoyed, and removing NISS' broad powers of arrest and detention (though these have since been reinstated, see below). Despite these reforms, the Respondent State has continued to target individuals on the basis of religion, particularly following the October 2021 military coup d'état and during the current armed conflict. For instance, on 22 June 2022, police in Zalingei (Central Darfur) arrested four young Christian men, and pursued five others, purportedly on charges of apostasy. Following questioning, the four men were released but were rearrested shortly afterwards. On 28 June 2022, the men were released on bail, and on 6 July 2022, the case file was closed as the offence of apostasy had been repealed. According to a reputable local news source, one of the men complained that all four individuals were "subjected to physical torture until the moment [they] were released under normal guarantee, after eight days." The Respondent State's actions during the ongoing armed conflict (which began on 15 April 2023) indicate that it has no intention to lift immunities shielding perpetrators of torture and associated violations. For instance: (i) on 8 February 2024, the de facto Sovereign Council of the Respondent State purportedly enacted the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, which re-introduces broad powers of arrest and detention, as well as sweeping immunities for NISS (which was rebranded the General Intelligence Service (GIS) in July 2019); and (ii) Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the de facto Head of State of the Respondent State, has reportedly granted a general amnesty to any combatant who defects from the Rapid Support Forces to the Respondent State-affiliated Sudanese Armed Forces.
Outstanding Gaps/Concerns	Numerous amendments remain necessary to align Sudanese law with the provisions of the African Charter. A future legitimate and democratically elected Sudanese government should consider prioritising the following reforms, amongst others: (i) amending the Criminal Law Act 1991 and Criminal Procedure Act 1991 to make torture a distinct criminal offence, drafted not as a "principle to be regarded" but as a specific and separate crime; ensure that torture is prohibited under all circumstances, including during declared states of emergency and situations of armed conflict, and prevent the defence of "military or superior orders" as a justification for torture;

	(ii) amending the Criminal Procedure Act 1991 and any other related rules of procedure to ensure that there is a duty to investigate allegations of torture, and any prosecutorial decision to initiate an investigation is non-discretionary; any investigation regarding allegations of torture is carried out by a prosecutor or independent investigator other than the one in charge of the initial criminal investigation; arrested individuals promptly receive access to independent legal assistance at the interrogation stage; an arrested person's right to inform a third party or family member as soon as possible upon arrest is guaranteed and not subject to prosecutorial or judicial approval; any person arrested and detained on a criminal charge is brought before a judge within 48 hours; and any person arrested and detained is guaranteed access to an independent medical examination; and (iii) amending the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, Armed Forces Act 2007, Police Forces Act 2008, National Security Act 2010, and other relevant laws to abolish immunities for acts of torture and other acts conducted during official business.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to take the necessary measures. See Recommendation 4 below for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	The Respondent State's authorities lack the legal and constitutional legitimacy to enact laws after the October 2021 coup. For this reason, recommendations for legal reform should be directed to a future legitimate and democratically elected Sudanese government. In any event, the General Intelligence Service Law (Amendment) 2024, while not validly enacted as law, will be of considerable practical significance in the current circumstances by facilitating indefinite detentions and related torture and ill-treatment, as well as further shielding GIS members from future prosecutions. In cases such as this where the Complainant(s) allege acts of torture for which the Respondent State is responsible, but the Commission only finds ill-treatment, the Commission should endeavour to provide detailed reasoning as to why the treatment complained of did not, in its view, amount to torture. See also Recommendations 2 (on restitution), 3 (on compensation), and 5 (on public apology).
RECOMMENDATION 2 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	The Commission recommends restitution to the Complainants for their original situation before the violations of the African Charter occurred.

Implementation Narrative (Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to make restitution to the Complainants.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to make restitution. See Recommendation 4 below for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 3 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	The Commission recommends that the Victims be compensated for material harm arising from the loss of the First Victim's land, businesses, and properties, and non-material harm arising from physical and psychological suffering.
Implementation Narrative (Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to assess and determine the appropriate compensation to address the harm suffered by the Victims.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	Due to the ongoing internal armed conflict in the Respondent State (and the challenges noted in Recommendation 4 below), the institutions which may be in charge of implementing this measure are not reliable.
Additional Comments (if any)	The likelihood of and obstacles to implementation in the Respondent State are likely to change over time. There may be new opportunities for implementation as part of a future peace, democratic transition, transitional justice, or reparation process. Meanwhile, given the Respondent State's history of serious violations of international law, any future implementation process will need to respond to an exceptionally large level of victimisation, stretching across multiple decades and different authorities. When hearing cases in which it finds that the Respondent State has violated provisions of the African Charter, the Commission should: (i) encourage the Complainant(s) to submit documentation substantiating the loss suffered; and (ii) endeavour to assess the minimum financial sum required for the Respondent State to make appropriate compensation. A specific financial sum as a reference point may increase the likelihood of implementation in the above circumstances.
RECOMMENDATION 4 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	The Commission recommends a prompt and impartial investigation into the First Victim's arrest, indictment, detention, conviction, and sentencing.

Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to investigate, prosecute, and punish the individuals responsible.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	Despite being regularly implicated in core international crimes, the Respondent State has declined to investigate, prosecute, and punish police, NISS, and other intelligence/security officers, except in exceptionally rare cases. This trend has been consistent through the Presidency of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019), the transitional government (2019-2021), the de facto authorities installed following the October 2021 military coup d'état (2021-2023), and the reconfigured coup authorities during the ongoing armed conflict (2023-present). The key factors driving this are: (i) the Respondent State's reliance on its torture apparatus to gain and preserve political power and wealth; (ii) resulting lack of political will to prosecute State security/intelligence actors; (iii) the extreme power, reach, and legal discretion of the NISS and other security/intelligence services, coupled with lack of oversight; (iv) lack of independence and oversight of the police, public prosecution, and judiciary; (v) lack of victim/witness protections; (vi) deliberate steps taken by the Respondent State to destroy or restrict access to evidence; and (vii) broad immunities from prosecution enjoyed by the NISS and other intelligence/security services. The few prosecutions that have taken place have been in response to isolated, often large-scale crimes, where there is significant, sustained public pressure to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A
RECOMMENDATION 5 Reproduce Recommendation here (verbatim):	The Commission recommends a public acknowledgement of the facts and a public apology for the violations of the African Charter suffered by the Complainants.
Implementation Narrative <i>(Indicate the Measures taken by the Respondent State, if any. Include sources of information. Attach evidence, where necessary)</i>	We are not aware of any measures taken by the Respondent State to issue a public acknowledgement of the facts and a public apology.
Outstanding Gaps or Concerns	To our best knowledge, the Commission's recommendation remains entirely unimplemented.
Challenges encountered in the implementation of the specific recommendation.	The main challenges are the ongoing armed conflict and lack of political will in the Respondent State to make a public acknowledgement and public apology. See

	Recommendation 4 above for additional detail on the lack of political will.
Additional Comments (if any)	N/A

SECTION V: CSO / NHRI FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION

This section captures concrete follow-up actions undertaken by the reporting CSO/NHRI to promote or monitor the implementation of the Commission's recommendations, including stakeholders' engagement and outcomes achieved. Leave this section blank if no follow-up actions have been undertaken.

<i>Decision / Recommendation Followed Up</i>	<i>Follow-up Action(s) Taken (e.g. letter, meeting, litigation, advocacy)</i>	<i>Key Stakeholders Engaged</i>	<i>Timeline / Dates</i>	<i>Outcomes of Engagement</i>	<i>Impact / Next Steps</i>
Communication 471/14	We continue to monitor the legal and factual situation in the Respondent State, including engaging with Sudanese CSOs working on torture and other human rights issues.	Sudanese CSOs	Ongoing	Monitoring, the findings of which are set out above.	
	We are in contact with the First Victim to coordinate on implementation of the Commission's recommendations.	Meriam Yahia Ibrahim (the First Victim)	Ongoing	Coordination, the findings of which are set out above.	

SECTION VI: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Indicate suggested follow-up actions (e.g. to send reminders, organize working meetings with parties, conduct hearings, undertake promotional or protective missions, referrals, etc.):

- (i) The Commission has recently decided numerous other cases finding the Respondent State responsible for violations of the African Charter, including Communications 402/11 & 420/12 (Sudanese Civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile), 443/13 (Safia Ishaq Mohammed Issa), 476/14 (Magdy Moustafa El-Baghdady), and 511/15 (Dr. Amin Mekki Medani and Mr. Farouq Abu Eissa). Given the common root causes of the underlying violations and the complementarity between the Commission's recommendations in these cases, the Commission should consider following up on the implementation of these cases jointly.
- (ii) The Commission should engage closely with the African Union Fact-Finding Mission on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (AU FFM) to ensure that its implementation process is coordinated with and informed by the work of the AU FFM, and so that the AU FFM can reflect and elaborate on the Commission's recommendations in its reports. This should also include close cooperation with the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, building on the [joint statement](#) issued by these bodies on 13 April 2026.
- (iii) The Commission should instruct the country rapporteur for the Respondent State to follow-up with the Respondent State authorities on implementation, including reminding the Respondent State to report on implementation.

- (iv) The Commission should instruct its Secretariat to publish and maintain a comprehensive register of all cases involving the Respondent State, recording the recommendations made and status of implementation.
- (v) The Commission should ensure that the full list of recommendations it has addressed to the Respondent State in its Sudan decisions to date is considered for any country visits, as well as the State reporting procedure/review process.
- (vi) The Commission should convene implementation working meetings and hearings with State representatives during its sessions and allow victims' representatives to participate in a section of the meeting, to promote implementation and dialogue (as is done in other regional human rights systems).


SECTION VII: DECLARATION

Kindly complete this section by either signing in ink (pen signature) and scanning the signed document, or by affixing a valid electronic signature.

I/We certify that the information provided in this form is accurate and submitted in good faith.

Name: Alejandra Vicente

Organisation: REDRESS

A handwritten signature in ink, appearing to read 'Alejandra Vicente', written over a horizontal line.

Signature:

Date: 23 June 2026