

**BRIEFING NOTE: Advancing Reparation for Victims of the War in Ukraine**  
**EEAS Civil Society Consultation, 12 May 2026**

Prepared by [REDRESS](#) – Learn more about our [Ukraine-related work here](#).

**VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE HAVE A RIGHT TO REPARATION**

1. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, human rights abuses – such as the use of torture and ill-treatment, including sexual violence – have been rampant. According to the [latest update](#) from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine on 10 April 2026, over 43,300 civilians have been injured, and more than 15,500 have lost their lives. Countless others continue to endure [lasting trauma](#). In addition, [millions](#) have been displaced, including approximately 20,000 children [forcibly transferred or deported](#) to Russia.
2. Under international law, victims of the conflict in Ukraine have a right to individual and collective reparation, including compensation, for the harms they have suffered. Public conversations about war reparations owed by the Russian State to the State of Ukraine often fail to mention individual reparation for victims. As the European Union contemplates its continued support for Ukraine, the need to dedicate funds for reparation for victims must not be overlooked; reparation can [transform the lives of victims](#) by allowing them to access medical, psychosocial and other rehabilitative services, repair their homes, and more.
3. On 23 April 2026, the EU [adopted](#) its 20<sup>th</sup> package of sanctions against Russia. The EU has [sanctioned](#) over 2,700 individuals and entities in connection with Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of Ukraine beginning in 2022. Approximately €210 billion of the Central Bank of Russia's assets are [immobilised](#) in the EU.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU**

4. The European Union should:
  - a) **Support the timely operationalisation of the International Claims Commission for Ukraine** by promptly ratifying the associated [Convention](#) and committing financial and technical support to the Claims Commission, [Register of Damage](#) and future compensation fund (the three components of the international compensation mechanism). The EU should support amending the Convention to include claims of damage, loss or injury dating back to 20 February 2014, to support the compensation of all victims of Russia's aggression, as survivor-led organisations have [advocated](#).
  - b) **Ensure that victims and survivors of torture and other serious international crimes since 2014 are included and prioritised** in any discussion about human rights, reconstruction or recovery. One key way this can be done is by facilitating civil society and survivor participation in the design and operationalisation of the international compensation mechanism, for example by ensuring transparency and opportunities for

engagement in upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Claims Commission.

- c) **Explore innovative ways to finance reparation, including through the repurposing of Russia-linked assets.** The EU has taken steps to immobilise and repurpose Russia-linked assets for the benefit of Ukraine, but most progress to date has focused on repurposing to finance broad packages of State-level assistance. Commitments to address victims' urgent reparation needs have been conspicuously absent. The EU should ensure that a portion of any repurposed funds is used to finance survivor-centred reparation for victims (see page 2 for details).
- d) **Ensure that a portion of the EU's new €90 billion support loan to Ukraine is used not only to support the international compensation mechanism, but also to fund the implementation of Ukraine's domestic reparation mechanisms to provide urgent interim reparation to victims.** While the international compensation mechanism is not yet fully operationalised and will only provide monetary compensation, Ukraine's domestic reparation mechanisms can provide broader, and urgently needed reparative support to victims in the nearer term, and broader and more transformative reparation measures, including rehabilitation measures, in the longer-term.

#### **GUIDELINES FOR REPURPOSING RUSSIA-LINKED ASSETS TO FINANCE REPARATION**

- 5. REDRESS recently published a set of [Guidelines for Repurposing Russia-Linked Assets to Finance Reparation for Victims of the Conflict in Ukraine](#). The below guidelines were developed through wide consultation with legal experts, policymakers, civil society groups, and survivor-led organisations.

#### **COMMIT TO FUNDING REPARATION**

##### **Guideline 1 – Commit to Funding Reparation from Russia-linked assets**

Funds collected from Russia-linked assets have mainly been allocated to financing broad packages of State-level assistance. Progress towards funding reparation for individual victims has, despite its complementarity, lagged significantly behind. This is a missed opportunity to contribute to victims' healing journeys – redressing harms that would otherwise compound, giving survivors a sense of justice, and empowering them as rights-holders. **Competent authorities should commit to financing reparation from Russia-linked assets as part of their priorities in supporting Ukraine.**

##### **Guideline 2 – Commit to Reforms to Enable Asset Repurposing**

Competent authorities have, with modest exceptions, yet to develop or use robust laws that enable the repurposing of Russia-linked assets to finance reparation. **Competent authorities should develop innovative legal frameworks for asset repurposing that are well-grounded in international law and demonstrate a level of ambition commensurate with the scale and gravity of victims' harms and the urgency of their needs.**

## SURVIVOR-CENTRED APPROACH

### Guideline 3 – Finance Survivor-Centred Reparation

Any reparation financing from Russia-linked assets should be situated within a comprehensive reparation strategy, guided at each stage by a survivor-centred approach. **Competent authorities should ensure that, taken as a collective, the reparation processes that they fund are inclusive, accessible, prompt, adequate, participatory, and comprehensive.**

### Guideline 4 – Reparation Should Be Properly Sequenced

While competent authorities should encourage initiatives to collect additional reparation information, some victims simply cannot wait for a comprehensive mapping exercise to run its course for their needs to be met. **Competent authorities should not wait for mappings to conclude and the final sum to be calculated. Now is the time to finance programmes that address the urgent reparation needs of those most vulnerable.**

## CHANNEL FUNDS STRATEGICALLY

### Guideline 5 – Channel Funds Via Trusted Reparation Bodies

Various bodies can play distinct, mutually reinforcing roles as part of a collective reparation response. This includes the Ukrainian State, the Claims Commission, the Trust Fund for Victims at the International Criminal Court, and civil society and survivor groups. **Competent authorities should fund a range of bodies to address the needs of all victims and mitigate the risk that reparation is delayed for years to come.**

### Guideline 6 – Establish Robust Monitoring Processes

Repurposing even a portion of Russia-linked assets will involve the transfer of millions of Euros, if not billions. **Competent authorities should implement robust safeguards to minimise the risk of fraud and corruption, while also facilitating iterative improvements to the underlying reparation processes.**

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